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Sustaining Digital Certificate Security – Entrust Certificate Distrust

Posted by Chrome Root Program, Chrome Security Team




The Chrome Security Team prioritizes the security and privacy of Chrome’s users, and we are unwilling to compromise on these values.


The Chrome Root Program Policy states that CA certificates included in the Chrome Root Store must provide value to Chrome end users that exceeds the risk of their continued inclusion. It also describes many of the factors we consider significant when CA Owners disclose and respond to incidents. When things don’t go right, we expect CA Owners to commit to meaningful and demonstrable change resulting in evidenced continuous improvement.


Over the past several years, publicly disclosed incident reports highlighted a pattern of concerning behaviors by Entrust that fall short of the above expectations, and has eroded confidence in their competence, reliability, and integrity as a publicly-trusted CA Owner.


In response to the above concerns and to preserve the integrity of the Web PKI ecosystem, Chrome will take the following actions.


Upcoming change in Chrome 127 and higher:



TLS server authentication certificates validating to the following Entrust roots whose earliest Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT) is dated after October 31, 2024, will no longer be trusted by default.


CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - EC1,OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms+OU=(c) 2012 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only,O=Entrust, Inc.,C=US

CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2,OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms+OU=(c) 2009 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only,O=Entrust, Inc.,C=US

CN=Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048),OU=www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits liab.)+OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited,O=Entrust.net

CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority,OU=www.entrust.net/CPS is incorporated by reference+OU=(c) 2006 Entrust, Inc.,O=Entrust, Inc.,C=US

CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4,OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms+OU=(c) 2015 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only,O=Entrust, Inc.,C=US

CN=AffirmTrust Commercial,O=AffirmTrust,C=US

CN=AffirmTrust Networking,O=AffirmTrust,C=US

CN=AffirmTrust Premium,O=AffirmTrust,C=US

CN=AffirmTrust Premium ECC,O=AffirmTrust,C=US
TLS server authentication certificates validating to the above set of roots whose earliest SCT is on or before October 31, 2024, will be unaffected by this change.This approach attempts to minimize disruption to existing subscribers using a recently announced Chrome feature to remove default trust based on the SCTs in certificates.


Additionally, should a Chrome user or enterprise explicitly trust any of the above certificates on a platform and version of Chrome relying on the Chrome Root Store (e.g., explicit trust is conveyed through a Group Policy Object on Windows), the SCT-based constraints described above will be overridden and certificates will function as they do today.


To further minimize risk of disruption, website operators are encouraged to review the “Frequently Asked Questions" listed below.

Why is Chrome taking action?



Certification Authorities (CAs) serve a privileged and trusted role on the Internet that underpin encrypted connections between browsers and websites. With this tremendous responsibility comes an expectation of adhering to reasonable and consensus-driven security and compliance expectations, including those defined by the CA/Browser TLS Baseline Requirements.


Over the past six years, we have observed a pattern of compliance failures, unmet improvement commitments, and the absence of tangible, measurable progress in response to publicly disclosed incident reports. When these factors are considered in aggregate and considered against the inherent risk each publicly-trusted CA poses to the Internet ecosystem, it is our opinion that Chrome’s continued trust in Entrust is no longer justified.

When will this action happen?



Blocking action will begin on approximately November 1, 2024, affecting certificates issued at that point or later.


Blocking action will occur in Versions of Chrome 127 and greater on Windows, macOS, ChromeOS, Android, and Linux. Apple policies prevent the Chrome Certificate Verifier and corresponding Chrome Root Store from being used on Chrome for iOS.

What is the user impact of this action?



By default, Chrome users in the above populations who navigate to a website serving a certificate issued by Entrust or AffirmTrust after October 31, 2024 will see a full page interstitial similar to this one.


Certificates issued by other CAs are not impacted by this action.

How can a website operator tell if their website is affected?



Website operators can determine if they are affected by this issue by using the Chrome Certificate Viewer.


Use the Chrome Certificate Viewer



Navigate to a website (e.g., https://www.google.com)

Click the “Tune" icon

Click “Connection is Secure"

Click “Certificate is Valid" (the Chrome Certificate Viewer will open)


Website owner action is not required, if the “Organization (O)” field listed beneath the “Issued By" heading does not contain “Entrust" or “AffirmTrust”.

Website owner action is required, if the “Organization (O)” field listed beneath the “Issued By" heading contains “Entrust" or “AffirmTrust”.




What does an affected website operator do?



We recommend that affected website operators transition to a new publicly-trusted CA Owner as soon as reasonably possible. To avoid adverse website user impact, action must be completed before the existing certificate(s) expire if expiry is planned to take place after October 31, 2024.


While website operators could delay the impact of blocking action by choosing to collect and install a new TLS certificate issued from Entrust before Chrome’s blocking action begins on November 1, 2024, website operators will inevitably need to collect and install a new TLS certificate from one of the many other CAs included in the Chrome Root Store.

Can I test these changes before they take effect?



Yes.


A command-line flag was added beginning in Chrome 128 (available in Canary/Dev at the time of this post’s publication) that allows administrators and power users to simulate the effect of an SCTNotAfter distrust constraint as described in this blog post FAQ.


How to: Simulate an SCTNotAfter distrust1. Close all open versions of Chrome2. Start Chrome using the following command-line flag, substituting variables described below with actual values


--test-crs-constraints=$[Comma Separated List of Trust Anchor Certificate SHA256 Hashes]:sctnotafter=$[epoch_timestamp]


3. Evaluate the effects of the flag with test websites Example: The following command will simulate an SCTNotAfter distrust with an effective date of April 30, 2024 11:59:59 PM GMT for all of the Entrust trust anchors included in the Chrome Root Store. The expected behavior is that any website whose certificate is issued before the enforcement date/timestamp will function in Chrome, and all issued after will display an interstitial.

--test-crs-constraints=02ED0EB28C14DA45165C566791700D6451D7FB56F0B2AB1D3B8EB070E56EDFF5,
43DF5774B03E7FEF5FE40D931A7BEDF1BB2E6B42738C4E6D3841103D3AA7F339,
6DC47172E01CBCB0BF62580D895FE2B8AC9AD4F873801E0C10B9C837D21EB177,
73C176434F1BC6D5ADF45B0E76E727287C8DE57616C1E6E6141A2B2CBC7D8E4C,
DB3517D1F6732A2D5AB97C533EC70779EE3270A62FB4AC4238372460E6F01E88,
0376AB1D54C5F9803CE4B2E201A0EE7EEF7B57B636E8A93C9B8D4860C96F5FA7,
0A81EC5A929777F145904AF38D5D509F66B5E2C58FCDB531058B0E17F3F0B41B,
70A73F7F376B60074248904534B11482D5BF0E698ECC498DF52577EBF2E93B9A,
BD71FDF6DA97E4CF62D1647ADD2581B07D79ADF8397EB4ECBA9C5E8488821423
:sctnotafter=1714521599

Illustrative Command (on Windows):

"C:\Users\User123\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome SxS\Application\chrome.exe" --test-crs-constraints=02ED0EB28C14DA45165C566791700D6451D7FB56F0B2AB1D3B8EB070E56EDFF5,43DF5774B03E7FEF5FE40D931A7BEDF1BB2E6B42738C4E6D3841103D3AA7F339,6DC47172E01CBCB0BF62580D895FE2B8AC9AD4F873801E0C10B9C837D21EB177,73C176434F1BC6D5ADF45B0E76E727287C8DE57616C1E6E6141A2B2CBC7D8E4C,DB3517D1F6732A2D5AB97C533EC70779EE3270A62FB4AC4238372460E6F01E88,0376AB1D54C5F9803CE4B2E201A0EE7EEF7B57B636E8A93C9B8D4860C96F5FA7,0A81EC5A929777F145904AF38D5D509F66B5E2C58FCDB531058B0E17F3F0B41B,70A73F7F376B60074248904534B11482D5BF0E698ECC498DF52577EBF2E93B9A,BD71FDF6DA97E4CF62D1647ADD2581B07D79ADF8397EB4ECBA9C5E8488821423:sctnotafter=1714521599
Illustrative Command (on macOS):

"/Applications/Google Chrome Canary.app/Contents/MacOS/Google Chrome Canary" --test-crs-constraints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sctnotafter=1714521599
Note: If copy and pasting the above commands, ensure no line-breaks are introduced.

Learn more about command-line flags here.
I use Entrust certificates for my internal enterprise network, do I need to do anything?
Beginning in Chrome 127, enterprises can override Chrome Root Store constraints like those described for Entrust in this blog post by installing the corresponding root CA certificate as a locally-trusted root on the platform Chrome is running (e.g., installed in the Microsoft Certificate Store as a Trusted Root CA).
How do enterprises add a CA as locally-trusted?
Customer organizations should defer to platform provider guidance.
What about other Google products?
Other Google product team updates may be made available in the future.
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Staying Safe with Chrome Extensions

Posted by Benjamin Ackerman, Anunoy Ghosh and David Warren, Chrome Security Team







Chrome extensions can boost your browsing, empowering you to do anything from customizing the look of sites to providing personalized advice when you’re planning a vacation. But as with any software, extensions can also introduce risk.


That’s why we have a team whose only job is to focus on keeping you safe as you install and take advantage of Chrome extensions. Our team:




Provides you with a personalized summary of the extensions you’ve installed

Reviews extensions before they’re published on the Chrome Web Store

Continuously monitors extensions after they’re published


A summary of your extensions



The top of the extensions page (chrome://extensions) warns you of any extensions you have installed that might pose a security risk. (If you don’t see a warning panel, you probably don’t have any extensions you need to worry about.) The panel includes:



Extensions suspected of including malware

Extensions that violate Chrome Web Store policies

Extensions that have been unpublished by a developer, which might indicate that an extension is no longer supported

Extensions that aren’t from the Chrome Web Store

Extensions that haven’t published what they do with data they collect and other privacy practices



You’ll get notified when Chrome’s Safety Check has recommendations for you or you can check on your own by running Safety Check. Just type “run safety check” in Chrome’s address bar and select the corresponding shortcut: “Go to Chrome safety check.”


User flow of removing extensions highlighted by Safety Check.


Besides the Safety Check, you can visit the extensions page directly in a number of ways:



Navigate to chrome://extensions

Click the puzzle icon and choose “Manage extensions”

Click the More choices menu and choose menu > Extensions > Manage Extensions


Reviewing extensions before they’re published



Before an extension is even accessible to install from the Chrome Web Store, we have two levels of verification to ensure an extension is safe:



An automated review: Each extension gets examined by our machine-learning systems to spot possible violations or suspicious behavior.

A human review: Next, a team member examines the images, descriptions, and public policies of each extension. Depending on the results of both the automated and manual review, we may perform an even deeper and more thorough review of the code.



This review process weeds out the overwhelming majority of bad extensions before they even get published. In 2024, less than 1% of all installs from the Chrome Web Store were found to include malware. We're proud of this record and yet some bad extensions still get through, which is why we also monitor published extensions.

Monitoring published extensions



The same Chrome team that reviews extensions before they get published also reviews extensions that are already on the Chrome Web Store. And just like the pre-check, this monitoring includes both human and machine reviews. We also work closely with trusted security researchers outside of Google, and even pay researchers who report possible threats to Chrome users through our Developer Data Protection Rewards Program.


What about extensions that get updated over time, or are programmed to execute malicious code at a later date? Our systems monitor for that as well, by periodically reviewing what extensions are actually doing and comparing that to the stated objectives defined by each extension in the Chrome Web Store.


If the team finds that an extension poses a severe risk to Chrome users, it’s immediately remove from the Chrome Web Store and the extension gets disabled on all browsers that have it installed.The extensions page highlights when you have a potentially unsafe extension downloaded




Others steps you can take to stay safe




Review new extensions before installing them



The Chrome Web Store provides useful information about each extension and its developer. The following information should help you decide whether it’s safe to install an extension:



Verified and featured badges are awarded by the Chrome team to extensions that follow our technical best practices and meet a high standard of user experience and design

Ratings and reviews from our users

Information about the developer

Privacy practices, including information about how an extension handles your data



Be careful of sites that try to quickly persuade you to install extensions, especially if the site has little in common with the extension.

Review extensions you’ve already installed



Even though Safety Check and your Extensions page (chrome://extensions) warn you of extensions that might pose a risk, it’s still a good idea to review your extensions from time to time.



Uninstall extensions that you no longer use.

Review the description of an extension in the Chrome Web Store, considering the extension’s ratings, reviews, and privacy practices — reviews can change over time.

Compare an extension’s stated goals with 1) the permissions requested by an extension and 2) the privacy practices published by the extension. If requested permissions don’t align with stated goals, consider uninstalling the extension.

Limit the sites an extension has permission to work on.


Enable Enhanced Protection



The Enhanced protection mode of Safe Browsing is Chrome’s highest level of protection that we offer. Not only does this mode provide you with the best protections against phishing and malware, but it also provides additional features targeted to keep you safe against potentially harmful extensions. Threats are constantly evolving and Safe Browsing’s Enhanced protection mode is the best way to ensure that you have the most advanced security features in Chrome. This can be enabled from the Safe Browsing settings page in Chrome (chrome://settings/security) and selecting “Enhanced”.

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